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1. Introduction
In a special issue of this journal (Jatinder et al., 2004), Peppard and Ward (2004) herald the
arrival of a new era beyond identifying ‘strategic systems’. In this era of IS capability, it is
required to “understand the mechanisms and processes that lead to the situation where an
organization repeatedly and continually realizes outcomes producing advantage in the
marketplace, through the deployment of IS/IT” (p.171). They posit that an IS capability
essentially represents “the organizations (sic) ability to connect technology to business
performance” (p.173) and argue that organizations must focus less on IT per se, and more on the
process of organizing and managing information, systems and technology within the firm.
Consequently, they elaborate on the concept of IS capability, since they conclude that “to date,
the IS literature has not articulated the exact nature of this capability” (p.173). Drawing on
Resource-based theory (RBT), the authors list the core components (i.e. 26 IS competencies)
and identify three inter-related attributes of an IS capability: a fusion of business knowledge
with IS knowledge, a flexible re-usable IT platform, and an effective use process.

We agree with Peppard and Ward (2004) with regard to the signalled new era and the
importance of defining the competencies that constitute an IS capability and of describing the
mechanisms relating this IS capability to organizational performance, or rather IS related rent 1 .
Nevertheless, their contribution does not come round to addressing these underlying
mechanisms. Furthermore, we appreciate their approach for taking RBT as a relevant theoretical
footing since RBT “offers a perspective distinct from the traditional Industrial Economics (IE)
viewpoint that has dominated the field for the last 50 years” (p.173). However, we argue that
eventually the two complementary theories need to be combined (Rivard et al., 2006; Spanos
and Lioukas, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984) in order to come to an elaborate understanding of the
mechanisms that explain how an IS capability leads to IS rent. Finally, we welcome Peppard
and Ward’s recognition of the importance of “collecting, organising and maintaining
information, and getting people to embrace the right behaviours and values for working with
information" (Marchand et al., 2000, p.70), in addition to systems and technology as sources of
sustained competitive advantage. Notwithstanding Peppard and Ward’s contribution, we agree
that there is still much to learn with regard to how IS capability will provide a real source of
value, specifically how information can become an essential part of a firm’s competitive power.

1

We adhere to the more precise economic terminology of rent instead of competitive advantage (see also
Wade and Hulland, 2004). Rents are “returns in excess of a resource owner’s opportunity costs, which is
defined as the revenue that a resource (bundle) can generate when put to an alternative use in the firm or
the price which it can be sold for” (Grant, 1991).
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In this paper we focus on the underlying mechanisms that relate IS capability, as independent
variable, to achieving IS rent, as dependent variable, by drawing on the complementarities
between RBT and IE as the dominant economics-based theories that recognize the strategic
potential of information and have enlightened our understanding of IS and competitive strategy
in a complementary fashion (e.g. Clemons et al., 2004). More precisely, we draw on RBT by
analyzing factor market imperfections that allow firms to create and sustain IS rents, and IE by
also including product markets in the analysis and taking into account the market structure as a
determinant of competitive position and rent potential. On these notes, we introduce an IS rent
framework and four corresponding IS rent propositions in order to characterize a firm’s IS rentseeking behaviour as a set of IS rent mechanisms that consist of fundamental decisions on
achieving IS rent, taking into account the firm’s idiosyncrasies and specific market context that
cause IS rent opportunities. This allows us to map a firm’s IS rent-seeking behaviour onto this
framework in a case study. Finally, we discuss the IS rent framework’s relevance in terms of its
contribution to furthering the new era of IS capability.
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2. IS rent framework
Our IS rent framework starts from an economics-based notion of strategy. In particular, we draw
on the complementarities with regard to rent source, perspective and domain of strategy
between RBT and IE (see Table 1), as the two economics-based theories that have dominated
the advance of our theoretical understanding of business strategy (Hoskisson et al., 1999;
Rumelt et al., 1991; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). Combining both theories implies taking a nonexclusive focus on the presumed drivers of rent.

Table 1 RBT and IE complementarities as a theoretical basis
Rent source

Perspective

Resource-based theory (RBT)

Industrial Economics (IE)

Market imperfections provide opportunities to

Market structure is the main determinant of a firm’s

realize efficiency-type (Penrosian, Ricardian)

relative competitive position and corresponding

rents (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001)

(monopoly) rents (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001)

Strategy is a continuous search for rents (Grant,

Strategy is impeding the market forces that annihilate rents

1991; Mahoney, 1995; Mahoney and Pandian,

(defensive effects) or influencing them in one’s favour

1992) consisting of seeing rent opportunities,

(offensive effects) (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001)

and being willing and able to act upon them
(Penrose, 1959, p.38)
Domain of

Rent opportunities derive from market

Rent opportunities derive from favourable circumstances

strategy

imperfections in (strategic) factor markets

of market forces in product markets (Porter, 1985)

(Barney, 1986)

This dual theoretical basis leads us to the following definition of IS capability and the
theoretical framework depicted in Figure 1. IS capability is defined as the ability to
continuously search for sustainable IS rent by exploring, identifying and deciding whether and
how to exploit IS rent opportunities in the factor and product markets that are relevant for
implementing a firm’s business strategy. Several elements of this definition need further
explication, foremost IS rent as a new rent type and the corresponding IS rent opportunities, and
the nature of IS rent-seeking behaviour.
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behavioural assumptions

Bounded
rationality

Opportunism
(Williamson,1975)

(Simon,1955)

EXPLORE

information imperfections

Incomplete
information

seeing IS rent
opportunities
EXPLOIT

willing to act upon
IS rent
opportunities

Information
asymmetry

information strategy decisions

Resolve
Other strategic domains
(e.g. IT, finance)

Consolidate

Business strategy

possibility to influence market transparency
allocative / dynamic ability

being able to act
upon IS rent
opportunities

Required
resources

Market
characteristics

Required
competencies

Market
mechanisms

Market parties

IS rent possibility

Figure 1 IS rent framework

At present, a rent type that focuses on and explains information-based performance differentials
has not been pinpointed, let alone defined 2 . We propound that a firm will earn IS rent when it is
less imperfectly informed relative to other market parties and is able to implement a strategy
that renders these differences so that it positively affects its ability to maximize the economic
value of its productive services. Our notion of IS rent thus accentuates imperfect information in
markets as a precondition for opportunities to earn this type of rent. Firms can encounter IS rent
opportunities in any market, regardless whether they are (strategic) factor (Barney, 1986) or
product markets, B2B or B2C markets (see ‘domain of strategy’ in Table 1). Analogous to Yao
(1988), we analyse the profit potential of markets by examining the effect of violating one of the
efficient market conditions that theoretically preclude firms to earn rents in the long run.
Consequently, for an IS rent opportunity to exist, price must not be a ‘sufficient statistic’
(Hayek, 1945) and information imperfections must be present in markets.
2

In the economic literature, the concept of ‘information rents’ has been narrowly applied to the analysis
of incentive contracts and principal-agent relationships (Aoki et al., 1990; Esö and Szentes, 2003). Even
though the general notion of the terms coincides with the meaning in this stream of literature, we adhere
to the term IS rent in order to consciously differentiate from this narrow notion and focus on any situation
including the principal-agent setting in which information yields rents.
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We define information imperfections as the instances in which firms do not have complete and
perfect information about all relevant aspects of market transactions and production, exchange
and distribution activities, including market opportunities, available technology, costs of
production under alternative production arrangements, the quality of goods produced and,
critically, the intentions of other market parties; and any new information is not instantly
disseminated to all market parties at no cost. Based on the behavioural assumptions that RBT
and IE have in common 3 , we distinguish between two interrelated types of information
imperfections: incomplete information and information asymmetry. With regard to the former,
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) explains humans’ limited rational information behaviour,
known as satisficing 4 : searching for a solution that meets the decision-maker’s aspiration levels
which is therefore acceptable. “Instead of a complete search for all relevant information, the
decision-maker only tries to attain a subjectively satisfying, yet incomplete level of information”
(Wigand et al., 1997, p.75, emphasis added). The behavioural assumption of bounded rationality
can thus account for the occurrence of incomplete information in the decision-making of firms.
The second type of information imperfection –information asymmetry– is linked to opportunism
(Williamson, 1975), defined as “self-interest seeking with guile involving self-disbelieved
threats and promises in order to realize individual advantages, which includes lying, stealing
and cheating, but more often less blatant forms of deceit. More generally, opportunism refers to
the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to mislead,
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, p.47, emphasis added).
Information imperfections therefore occur even when parties have identical information and, a
fortiori, if information differences exist. However, it is not until the information difference is
coupled with (a) the high costs of achieving information parity and (b) the proclivity of parties
to behave opportunistically that an information asymmetry 5 subsists. The two types of
information imperfections are interrelated since incomplete information is a necessary condition
for informational asymmetry between firms. In their search for IS rents, firms decide whether
and how to address these instances of incomplete information and information asymmetry to
their economic advantage.

3

IE differs from RBT in its assumption on the type of bounds on rationality (Conner, 1991), but both
perspectives are based on limited rationality (Simon, 1955).
4
Besides Simon’s interpretation of satisficing, other interpretations exist (Seth and Thomas, 1994).
Nelson and Winter, for instance, distinguish between a limited information model, in which there is
uncertainty about knowing which state of the world is true and a model in which decision-makers have
limited cognitive abilities which preclude knowledge of which states are possible (Nelson and Winter,
1982, p.174).
5
Williamson (1975, p.31) designates this condition as information impactedness; we adhere to the
widespread concept of information asymmetry.
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In defining what IS rent-seeking behaviour encompasses, we draw on Penrose’s (1959, p.31)
tripartite seeing, willing and being able perspective on strategic decision-making, which refines
the common divide in the strategy literature between exploration and exploitation (Knott, 2002;
Williams, 1994). IS rent-seeking involves exploring, identifying and deciding whether and how
to exploit instances of incomplete information and information asymmetry in the factor and
product markets that are relevant for implementing a firm’s business strategy, including
offensive and defensive effects (see ‘perspective’ in Table 1). Increasingly, exploration for new
competencies for survival in dynamic environments and exploitation of existing capabilities for
success in competitive environments are seen as necessary complements for developing
strategies (e.g. Zack, 1999). Analogously, external environment scanning (seeing and willing)
stressed by IE and internal capability development (willing and being able) stressed by RBT are
seen as complementary determinants of profit performance, collectively covering the four
elements of a SWOT-analysis (Ansoff, 1965). As a result, the IS rent framework focuses on a
firm’s strategic factor and product markets for discovering the rent-earning potential of
information imperfections, and takes into account within-firm aspects as well as the surrounding
competitive market environment of the industry (see ‘rent source’ in Table 1).

3. Exploring IS rent opportunities
In exploring or seeing opportunities to earn IS rent (see Figure 1), the firm needs to identify
practical manifestations of information imperfections. This involves identifying the factor and
product markets that are relevant for implementing its business strategy and assessing in each of
these markets which instances of incomplete information and information asymmetry are
present.

From the individual firm’s perspective, instances of incomplete information occur when it
makes exchange-related decisions without being able to dispose of all the potentially relevant
information required to make the economically most efficient decision (satisficing). In factor
markets, a firm faces such instances for example when it lacks information about the
availability, prices and quality of resources at the different resource suppliers, or the intentions
of firms competing for the same resources. In product markets, these instances of incomplete
information could for example include a lack of information about customer demands, their
price and quality sensitivity, potential substitute products, and the intentions of competitors and
potential entrants.
Instances of asymmetrical information are found in the occasion that a firm has private
information that is costly to draw level for other market parties, and the private information is
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used to benefit the firm possessing the advantage. From the individual firm’s perspective,
information asymmetries can only be identified taking into account other market parties and
take practical shape as either an information advantage or information disadvantage. Whereas
the classic examples of information asymmetry in the insurance and used-automobile industry
(adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (e.g. Arrow, 1984)) illustrate how
informational advantages are hazardous to economic transactions, more recent contributions
exemplify how information advantages can be strategically exploited in product markets as for
instance in product diversification (Nayyar, 1990), and R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Davis,
2001). Not only adhering to the latter view, we also add that information advantages are not
restricted to product markets, but can be exploited in strategic factor markets as well. An
example would be when a firm is able to make an accurate expectation of the future value of
specific management or R&D skills to be acquired on labour markets while others
underestimate the return potential of such skills (Barney, 1986).

4. Exploiting IS rent opportunities
In exploiting opportunities to earn IS rent (see Figure 1), firms need to decide whether they are
willing and able to exploit the identified IS rent opportunities. This entails a choice on whether
and how to address the instances of information imperfections in the strategic factor and product
markets identified in the explore-part. A firm decides (a) whether the firm is anxious to exploit
the identified instances of information imperfections (willing to act upon IS rent opportunities)
and (b) whether it is possible and worthwhile to dedicate resources and competencies to address
the instances of information imperfection (being able to act upon IS rent opportunities).

The willingness of a firm to act upon IS rent opportunities is partly influenced by choices in
adjacent strategic domains, such as business strategy, finance and IT. For instance, firms
pursuing a cost leadership strategy can be expected to regard increased price transparency as
desirable, whereas firms with good reputations and large marketing budgets could regard
increased transparency of price, product, and quality differences as particularly undesirable.
Market opaqueness allows such firms to influence consumers’ perceptions in their comparisons
through intensive marketing.

The ability of a firm to act upon IS rent opportunities is influenced both by its allocative and
dynamic ability (i.e. the extent to which it can acquire and learn to employ the resources and
competencies required to implement its decision), and the intrinsic possibility to influence a
market’s information imperfections given the market’s (micro)structure (Spulber, 1999). In the
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theoretical framework, we account for market microstructure under three headers: the market
characteristics, market mechanisms, and possible (counter)actions and opportunistic attitudes of
other market parties. This includes for instance the number and diversity of market parties, the
level of resource or product homogeneity, the degree of regulation or formalization of
transactions and the proclivity of market parties to behave opportunistically. Markets that are
characterized by many different opportunistic market parties, a high level of product
differentiation and a low degree of formalization in transactions are intrinsically more opaque
than highly regulated markets for homogeneous goods with fixed prices. Consequently, the
possibility for a firm to address the information imperfections and to influence the market’s
transparency will differ given the idiosyncrasies of the market’s microstructure.

All of the above considerations in the exploit-part can be captured in a fundamental difference
in IS rent-seeking: firms either resolve or consolidate an instance of information imperfection.
A firm that decides to resolve instances of information imperfection dedicates extra resources
and competencies, such as information, IT and analytical skills in order to become more
completely informed about particular aspects of strategic factor and product markets, while a
firm that decides to consolidate does not. This simple difference enables to describe the essence
of a firm’s IS rent-seeking behaviour in terms of a set of generic resolve/consolidate decisions.
Collectively, these decisions within the firm and market context and the dynamic reactions
provoked with competitors are the IS rent mechanisms that determine to what extent a firm is
able to actually earn IS rent.

5. IS rent propositions
In a competitive market, the possibility for a firm to earn IS rent involves trade-offs since it codepends on other parties’ strategies. More specifically, it partly depends on the extent to which
the IS rent-seeking behaviour of other market parties and the market’s structure leave room for
addressing instances of incomplete information and information asymmetry, and partly on the
willingness and ability of the firm to seize the opportunity and exploit it to its own benefit.
Notably, not all IS rent decisions directly aim for IS rent: some are aimed at withholding other
firms from earning it or at alleviating competitive disadvantages. Similar to the IE perspective
(see ‘perspective’ in Table 1), IS rent-seeking behaviour includes defending itself from
competitive forces (defensive effects) and influencing them in its favour (offensive effects). The
four IS rent propositions below (P1 to P4) provide an overview of IS rent decisions and form the
theoretical core of the mechanisms that link a firm’s IS capability to the possibility to earn IS
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rent. For a complete understanding of how and why a firm realizes IS rents the specific market
and firm context needs to be taken into account in addition (see our case study).

P1: A firm can seize an opportunity to earn IS rent by:

(a) privately resolving an instance of incomplete information into an information advantage,
either individually or in cooperation with other market parties, or

(b) consolidating an instance of information advantage over other market parties, either
individually or in cooperation with other market parties.

Firms can decide to (a) actively create an instance of information advantage or (b) protect and
exploit an existing instance of information advantage. In factor markets, private or strategically
disclosed information could enable a firm to make a more accurate expectation of the future
value of a resource than other market parties. These expected value differences might not be
reflected in the price of the resource acquired, therefore the firm can earn IS rent in case the
resource proves to be undervalued as a result of the other market parties’ information
disadvantage (cf. Barney, 1986). In product markets, a firm can earn IS rent in case its private or
strategically disclosed information allows it to maximize the value of the productive service of
its resource bundles, while the information disadvantage hinders other market parties’ value
maximization.

P2: A firm can (consciously) ignore an opportunity to earn IS rent by:

(a) consolidating an instance of incomplete information, and thus not privately resolving it into
an information advantage, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties.

Since some of the IS rent decisions require a firm to dedicate extra resources and competencies,
implementing them can incur costs. These costs are associated with the resources and
competencies that need to be acquired or developed, and employed. Firms can decide that it is
impossible, insufficiently worthwhile or too costly to dedicate resources and competencies to
create an information advantage over other market parties compared to the expected IS rent that
could be appropriated from the advantage. In factor markets, the cost incurred could exceed the
expected future value of a resource. Similarly, the expected benefit in value maximization in
product markets could not outweigh the costs associated with implementing the IS rent-seeking
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decision required to realize this benefit. In either case, this implies that an instance of
incomplete information is left as an IS rent opportunity for other market parties.

P3: A firm can tolerate other market parties to earn IS rent by:

(a) consolidating an instance of information disadvantage that it has relative to other market
parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties, or

(b) resolving an instance of information advantage by sharing its private information with other
market parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties.

A firm can decide to (a) consolidate an information disadvantage, for it is impossible, not
worthwhile or too costly to draw level the disadvantage that allows the market party with the
advantage to earn IS rent. Possibly, the resources or competencies required to draw level the
disadvantage are unavailable, the opportunistic practices of the market party with the advantage
might be highly unlikely to be given up, or the benefit of resolving the disadvantage might not
compensate for the costs incurred. Alternatively, a firm can decide to (b) resolve an instance of
information advantage for the sake of strategic cooperation with other market parties (e.g.
strategic alliances, franchises or joint ventures). The IS rent that is earned with the information
advantage can then be divided amongst the cooperative market parties. A possible motive to
resolve an information advantage is the expectation to increase the total amount of IS rent that
can be earned from the combined information of individual market parties.

P4: A firm can reduce the IS rent that other market parties earn by:

(a) privately resolving an instance of information disadvantage that it has relative to other
market parties, either individually or in cooperation with other market parties.

Typical examples of firms attempting to reduce or draw level instances of information
disadvantage are for example price/product comparison websites or information-based
intermediaries (infomediaries or web-aggregators (Madnick et al., 2000; Zhu et al., 2001).
These firms can reduce or even entirely evaporate the benefit of private or strategically
disclosed information of other market parties by aggregating information and facilitating
comparisons of resources of different suppliers in factor markets or products/services of
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different firms in product markets. Firms that are able to resolve information disadvantages are
in a position to pressure other market parties to give up (part of) their IS rent, therewith
potentially creating an information advantage for themselves.
The total amount of IS rent a firm can appropriate with its IS rent-seeking behaviour is thus
determined by the amount of IS rent appropriated and sustained by each of the IS rent
mechanisms in strategic factor and product markets, minus the costs incurred with the
implementation of these mechanisms. On top of this, a firm needs to be aware of the extent to
which its behaviour changes the nature, or ‘rules’, of competition in a market and the likely
counteraction it provokes at other market parties. In addition, regulatory authorities such as
market or governmental authorities (e.g. SEC) are in a position to limit the amount of IS rent
firms can appropriate. These institutions can decide to publicly resolve instances of incomplete
information or information asymmetry either by law or regulation supported by ‘watchdogs’.
These regulatory measures are generally aimed at reducing the amount of IS rent that can be
earned by firms in order to increase economic and social welfare.

6. Research methodology
In order to enhance our IS rent framework and theoretical IS rent propositions we conducted a
two-year qualitative sector study of the Dutch leisure travel industry in order to gain insight in
the nature of IS rent mechanisms in practice. The travel industry is suitable for this empirical
study for its high information-intensiveness and low degree of informational transparency. IS
rent-seeking behaviour can thus be expected to be a highly relevant aspect of a firm’s strategy
and business model, to possibly have a considerable influence on the market’s transparency and
to actually result in IS rent. These industry characteristics increase the likelihood of
encountering a variety of IS rent mechanisms covering the four theoretical propositions.

The sector study included an in-depth case study at three successive market parties in the value
chain: an airline, tour operator TravelCom and a travel comparison website. In these
organizations 25 semi-structured interviews were held with managers in various positions
ranging from managing director, financial director, IT/information manager to managers in
sales, purchase and marketing. The initial firm contact and the available highest-ranking
manager were first interviewed to determine the factor and product markets that were crucial for
the firm’s business. For each of these markets, the corresponding managers were identified and
contacted for an interview. These interviews were structured in accordance with the theoretical
framework and addressed the manager’s role in the context of the overall firm, some key figures
and their perception of the firm’s strategic spearheads, the information imperfections that they
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identified in the market they were responsible for and their analysis of the corresponding IS rent
decisions. The interviews were complemented by written documentation such as company
reports, annual reports, industry rules and guidelines, and information from the company
website and intranet, allowing data triangulation. All available data were transcribed, coded
with a coding scheme that was derived from the theoretical framework and analysed using a
software tool (Atlas.ti) for qualitative data analysis. The coded data were ordered in
conceptually-ordered displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994) to relate and confront both
corresponding and contradictory sayings on IS rent decisions in a particular market (full details
on the method and coding scheme can be found in (Truijens, 2004).

The synthesized findings of the sector study are presented through the lens of tour operator
TravelCom. We adopt TravelCom as the focal organization for the analysis for it is at the centre
of the sector’s competitive arena: surrounded on its strategic factor and product markets by
market parties that are confronted with and react to its IS rent-seeking behaviour. The specific
choice for TravelCom is justified by its reputation of being the most information-oriented travel
organization within the largest Dutch travel concern with an above-average net margin of 7%,
while the industry’s average is 1 to 2%. If, in fact, these above-average returns can be (partly)
related to TravelCom’s IS capability, this would have to show in a general trend in its behaviour
to actively seek IS rent.
TravelCom is one of the three subsidiary companies of the largest Dutch travel organization.
TravelCom is the fifth largest tour operator in the Netherlands with around 200 employees
(excluding travel agency personnel), approximate annual returns of 100 M€ accounted for by
around 200.000 vacationers. It produces package tours by allotting, coordinating and combining
individual travel components allocated at various factor markets. The markets for charter flights,
scheduled flights and accommodation are the core constituent components and thus considered
as the strategic factor markets for tour operators. As a distributor of package tours, TravelCom
sells its travel products on the product market for package tours. It focuses on offering package
tours for groups in the form of organized round trips at cultural locations and city trips and
intends to maximize its net margin by generating the highest possible returns on invested
capital. At current, the success of this objective shows in a positive net margin that is
significantly higher than the industry’s average. We argue that this difference can be partly
explained by TravelCom’s business strategy and partly by its IS rent-seeking behaviour.
Therefore, the essence of TravelCom’s business strategy is first briefly characterized, followed
by an overview the IS rent-seeking mechanisms in the strategic factor and product markets to
assess how its decisions relate to the theoretical IS rent propositions.
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7. Findings and discussion
Whereas the majority of tour operators primarily focus on realizing economies of scale in
purchasing travel components, TravelCom differs in its business strategy and IS capability and
has a demand-side orientation. This orientation is tantamount to a concentration of effort to
capture and analyse information about its customers’ needs and preferences for travel products.
A number of data capturing tools, a data warehouse, and CRM-like tools and analysis
techniques facilitate the storage and analysis of information on past and current booking
behaviour of customer groups and the results of customer satisfaction surveys (average response
rate 40%). This demand-side information allows TravelCom to adapt its product offering to suit
the needs of its customers in a dozen labels that focus on a variety of narrowly defined target
groups (e.g. active 55+ seniors, adventurous young people, sports-lovers, Christians or single
travelers). Each label is approached with a tailor-made service proposition, marketing approach
and corresponding distribution channel. In its marketing strategy, TravelCom employs multiple
distribution channels to promote and sell its products. As a direct seller, TravelCom relies both
on its company-owned retail outlets (approximately 25 in number spread over the Netherlands,
that account for 80% of the total returns), and on its call centre, online booking facilities, direct
mailings and advertisements in newspapers and magazines. TravelCom takes an active approach
in directly marketing its travel products to specific target groups based on previous bookings
and information gathered from customer contact (e.g. click behaviour on its website, interaction
with the call centre, reactions to direct mailings). The combination of a multi-channel and direct
marketing approach allows TravelCom to respond to unforeseen fluctuations in travel demand
more rapidly than its brochure-based competitors.

Table 2 provides an overview of TravelCom’s IS rent-seeking mechanisms, showing the
strategic factor or product market in which the information imperfections were identified, the
source, type and specific instance of imperfection, TravelCom’s decision to either resolve or
consolidate it and the corresponding strategic assumption with regard to IS rent.
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Table 2 Overview of TravelCom’s IS rent mechanisms
Market

Sourceof

(factor/product)

imperfections

Charterflights

negotiation-based

information disadvantage

market mechanism

(vis-à-vis airlines)

(factor market)
nostandardsto calculate
allotment prices

negotiation-based
Scheduled flights

Type of imperfection

volume discounts

information disadvantage
(vis-à-vis competing tour
operators)
information disadvantage
(vis-à-vis competing tour
operators)

Instance of information imperfection

Decision

Uncertain whether charter service to
particular destinations will exist the

consolidate

coming season
Allotment prices that competing tour
operators negotiate at airlines

Quoted fares that competing tour operators
negotiate at airlines

consolidate

resolve

Strategic assumption and
IS rent proposition
Tolerate others to earn InfoRent by avoiding the
market for charter flights (P3a)

Tolerate others to earn InfoRent by avoiding the
market for charter flights (P3a)

Reduce the InfoRent of others by estimation through
comparison with own allotment volumes (P4a)

(factor market)
negotiation-based

information advantage

Quoted fares that TravelCom negotiates at

volume discounts

(over competing tour operators)

airlines

amount and variety of
accommodation supply

difficulty of quality
Accommodation

assessment

incomplete information

incomplete information

The range of available accommodation
worldwide

consolidate

information on its quoted fares (P1b)
Seize InfoRent opportunity by gathering information

resolve

from local agents and hosts, and attending
professional meetings (P1a)

The quality, and quality of service of
accommodation

Seize InfoRent opportunity through accommodation
resolve

Quoted allotment prices that competing

negotiation-based

information disadvantage (vis-à-

volume discounts

vis accommodation suppliers)

negotiation-based

information advantage

Quoted allotment prices that TravelCom

volume discounts

(over competing tour operators)

negotiates at accommodation suppliers

tour operators have negotiated at

resolve

accommodation suppliers

16

visits, satisfaction surveys and a subscription to
Toeristiek (P1a)

(factor market)
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Seize InfoRent opportunity by not disclosing

consolidate

Reduce the InfoRent of others by estimation through
comparison with its own allotment volumes (P4a)
Seize InfoRent opportunity by not disclosing
information on its quotes prices (P1b)

potential of CRM not
recognized;
Package tours
(product market)

intermediation by travel

Seize InfoRent opportunity by registering and
incomplete information

Consumer demand for package tours

resolve

information (P1a)

agents
advertising all-inclusive
prices

analyzing booking history and customer contact

information advantage
(over consumers and competing

The price composition of package tours

tour operators)
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consolidate

Seize InfoRent opportunity by differentiating
products from competitors (P1b)

TravelCom’s decision to tolerate others to earn IS rent on the strategic factor market for charter flights
relates to the absence of incentives for airlines to disclose the aggregate requested demand for seats to a
particular destination. As a consequence, tour operators have only limited information about the
probability that an airline will service a destination the coming season. Also, competing tour operators will
not disclose the allotment prices that they have negotiated at airlines, since TravelCom could exploit this
information in its own allotment negotiations. These information disadvantages have made TravelCom
decide to avoid the use of charter flights as travel component in its package tours as much as possible and
to use flights from scheduled service carriers instead.
In the strategic factor market for scheduled flights, the main information imperfection is the nondisclosure of quoted fares (i.e. price including large volume discounts) that tour operators negotiate at
airlines. However, these quoted fares can be estimated by analyzing the commercial fares listed in Global
Distribution Systems. Over the years, TravelCom has built up experience in making these estimates by
analyzing the volumes and trends of competitors in previous seasons, comparing this estimated volume
with its own allotment volume and calculating the discounts that relate to this difference. TravelCom uses
this information as a benchmark in its negotiations with airlines on scheduled flights in order to reduce the
IS rent competitors can earn. At the same time, TravelCom complies with not disclosing its quoted fares in
order to hamper less experienced competitors in estimating the quoted fares that TravelCom negotiates
itself.
The strategic factor markets for accommodation is characterized by the difficulty of quality assessment,
besides a lack of price transparency. Whereas some tour operators believe it is the accommodation
provider’s responsibility to provide correct information on the quality of its accommodation, TravelCom
actively seeks to gain this insight itself by relying on three information sources: accommodation visits and
experiences by local agents and hosts, results and trends from customer satisfaction surveys providing
detailed information on the perceived accommodation quality, and objective information on
accommodation provided by a subscription to Toeristiek 6 . TravelCom actively creates and sustains this
information advantage, since it enables to ensure high quality accommodation and to optimally adjust the
acquisition of travel components to the preferences of its intended target groups.

6

Information supplier Toeristiek regularly visits holiday resorts and accommodations worldwide in order to check
whether the published information in brochures matches the actual situation. These checks include for instance the
walking distance to the beach or pool, the exact room size, wheel chair accessibility and the quality and availability
of guest facilities such as showers, child seats and lockers.
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In the product market for package tours TravelCom seizes the IS rent opportunity created by a general
lack of insight in consumer demand by registering and analyzing booking histories of its existing
customer-base through CRM and data warehouse techniques. Compared to the majority of tour operators
who are at the very beginning of structurally collecting and analyzing information about consumer
demand, TravelCom has build up experience in analyzing customer information over the last 15 years,
which proves to be a crucial element of its IS capability. It derives customer profiles from these data
distinguishing socio-demographics, holiday needs, booking behaviour and attitudes towards destinations
or type of travel. Moreover, its direct sales strategy puts it in full control of the process of capturing and
analyzing the required information for the analyses. When in fact TravelCom proofs to derive better
expectations about consumer demand than competitors, it forms an attractive party for airlines in the seat
allotments negotiations. Moreover, it allows TravelCom to optimize on economies of scale in both flight
and accommodation allotments, and to be able to take the appropriate level of risk-taking in its contracts,
therewith lowering the allotment price.
In order to guard itself against the increasingly price-based competition TravelCom advertises its products
with an all-inclusive price and inhibits price comparisons of its products with competing products through
product differentiation. This prevents consumers and travel comparison websites from making objective
comparisons based on prices of the individual components of a package tour. TravelCom seizes an IS rent
opportunity by forcing consumers to pay attention to the content, quality and service level of the package
tour and relies on a relatively large marketing budget and an established reputation for offering up-market
package tours.

Reflecting on the four IS rent propositions (see Table 3), TravelCom can be characterized as an IS rentseeker that seizes opportunities to earn IS rent (P1a or P1b) and reduces the IS rent of others (P4a). This
confirms our initial expectation that was based on TravelCom’s reputation of being information-oriented
and its 5 to 6% above-average net margin. 7

7

Quantifying the exact share of IS rent in a firm’s overall rents is arrested by measurement problems that are equally
relevant to all existing rent types that distinguish the source of above-average performance.

19
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-10

Relating IS capability to IS rent: Towards understanding the underlying mechanisms

Table 3 TravelCom’s IS rent decisions per proposition
IS rent proposition
P1a

Imperfection

Decisions

incomplete

resolve privately

Seize IS rent opportunity

Markets (# of instances)
- Accommodation (2x)
- Package tours (1x)
- Scheduled flights (1x)

P1b

advantage

consolidate

- Accommodation (1x)
- Package tours (1x)

Ignore IS rent

P2a

incomplete

consolidate

---

Tolerate others to earn IS

P3a

disadvantage

consolidate

- Charter flights (2x)

rent

P3b

advantage

resolve

---

P4a

disadvantage

resolve

opportunity

Reduce the IS rent of
others

- Scheduled flights (1x)
- Accommodation (1x)

The primary ‘offensive’ focus (cf. Spanos and Lioukas (2001) of TravelCom’s rent-seeking behaviour is
actively seeking and capitalizing on IS rent in the product market for package tours. Undeniably,
TravelCom’s business strategy and IS capability are driven by its focus to capture the value of customer
information where competitors have been structurally unaware, underestimating or incapable of grasping
the opportunities of using customer information and CRM techniques to improve business. As the
financial director stated: “Other tour operators simply do not have the customer information that we have
built up. They have never been aware of the value of knowing your customers.” Even though the industry
increasingly recognizes the importance and value of this information, TravelCom has a 15-year lead in
developing the IS competencies to gather and analyse customer information and adjusting its business
strategy and IS capability accordingly. The head of IS explained: “Our success is not an incident, but a
direct result of our commercial strategy. The sustained competitive advantage draws to a large extent on
our knowledge of our customers-base and everything that results indirectly from it. (…) Knowing our
customers enables us to effectively adapt our purchase policy of travel components. In the end, it’s all
about the customer, not the product.” Hence, TravelCom’s IS capability is driven principally by its ability
to collect, store, maintain and interpret information, and is based on the information-based competences
that are reinforcing and reinforced by its business and IS/IT strategy.

The secondary, more ‘defensive’ focus (cf. Spanos and Lioukas (2001), that we distinguish in
TravelCom’s IS rent-seeking behaviour is: (a) to avoid markets that are inherently opaque and (b) to
reduce the amount of IS rent others earn. TravelCom’s decision to tolerate others to earn IS rent (P3a) and
to avoid the market for charter flights is guided by its expectation not to earn IS rent itself and more
20
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importantly the expectation that airlines will exploit their information advantage at the detriment of tour
operators. Finally, the remaining IS rent-seeking decisions in both its strategic factor markets are aimed at
reducing the IS rent that others can earn (P4a) by preventing them to sustain any information advantages.

The TravelCom case has enlightened the IS rent framework in various regards. It shows that a range of
market- and firm-specific causes of market opaqueness can be classified under the headers of either
incomplete information or information asymmetry. Similarly, it shows how a range of idiosyncratic
considerations can be caught in the dichotomy of two fundamental IS rent-seeking decisions: resolve or
consolidate. Next, the case exemplifies how a market’s microstructure determines the possibility for a firm
to influence a market’s transparency. Finally, the study shows the importance of a firm’s allocative and
dynamic ability to implement IS rent-seeking behaviour. Taken together, the case demonstrates that the
four theoretical rent propositions provide a good point of departure for identifying and describing ten
actual IS rent mechanisms employed by TravelCom (see Table 2).

8. Conclusions and implications
The IS rent framework is a first step in showing that an understanding of IS capability should be based on
the complementarities between RBT and IE. We argue that this will ease the “fusion of IS knowledge with
business knowledge” (Peppard and Ward, 2004, p.183) since our knowledge of IS capability can then be
based on the same two theoretical bases that have dominated the advance of the business strategy field.
This implies that the development of an IS capability should include a focus on both factor and product
markets, within-firm factors and market structure as sources of performance, the tripartite of seeing,
willing and being able to address IS rent opportunities, and offensive and defensive effects in order to
continually realize outcomes producing advantage in the marketplace.

In addition, the concept of IS capability can benefit from a more explicit focus on the rent-potential of
information, in addition to the emphasis on improving the behaviour and values around information use
(Marchand et al., 2001). Our focus enhances the current understanding of IS capability in several ways.
Foremost, it explains more precisely how an IS capability can result in IS rents by highlighting the
mechanisms around information imperfections in factor and product markets (i.e. IS rent opportunities).
Consequently, the IS rent framework has introduced IS rent as dependent variable for an IS capability and
distinguishes four IS rent propositions that capture both offensive and defensive effects of IS rent-seeking
behaviour. This allows us to test the extent to which firms with a presumed IS capability are capable of
implementing an “effective use process” (Peppard and Ward, 2004, p.184) and can thus be characterized
as IS rent-seekers. Second, the IS rent framework emphasizes ‘exploration’ as an important IS competence
21
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domain that precedes the ‘exploitation’ competencies that Peppard and Ward discern. Third, it adds
scrutiny to these exploitation competencies by distinguishing between willing and being able to act upon
identified IS rent opportunities and by including both internal firm-specific factors (i.e. allocative and
dynamic ability) and external market microstructure as contingent factors in the mechanisms that lead to
IS rent.
Finally, the IS rent framework supports the newly introduced view of alignment (Peppard and Ward,
2004). It stresses the tripartite nature of the strategic alignment issue (Maes, 2004) instead of the
traditional dyadic view of business-IT alignment. A firm’s IS rent-seeking behaviour (and thus IS
capability) is influenced, restricted and facilitated by both its business strategy and its IT strategy,
including the underlying IT competencies and the extent to which the firm is able to provide a “flexible
and reusable IT infrastructure” (Peppard and Ward, 2004, p.183). Vice versa, IS rent-seeking behaviour
can co-determine a firm’s business and IT strategy and IT infrastructure requirements, such as the need for
adopting emerging technologies that increase the firm’s possibilities to earn IS rent.

We conclude by identifying several research opportunities related to the introduced IS rent framework.
The first opportunity relates to the difficulty of quantifying the exact share of a firm’s rents that can be
labelled as IS rent. The problem of quantifying the exact part of a certain rent type in a firm’s overall rents
is not exclusive for IS rent; it is equally relevant for all distinguished rent types. Part of TravelCom’s
success can be ascribed to its unique position as a direct seller using multi-channelling in its marketing.
However, several direct-selling competitors exist within the travel industry that are significantly less
successful. We hold that a firm’s IS capability to explore and exploit information imperfections and its
capability to combine this into a superior overall business strategy makes the difference. In general, the
more information-intensive a firm is, the more business strategy depends on its IS capability, the larger
part IS rent has in a firm’s overall rents.

This assumption, however, needs further investigation, for instance by conducting sector studies in
information-intensive and less information-intensive industries other than the travel industry 8 . Other
research opportunities include for instance the further incorporation of process and competitive dynamic
aspects of IS rent-seeking and the sustainability of IS rent. Finally, a major challenge resides in examining
the consequences of including interpretation and sense-making aspects of information (cf. Choo and
Bontis, 2002) into the framework.

8

In general, more sector, or industry level, studies should be conducted in IS (Crowston and Myers, 2004).
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These and other topics need to be explored in order to further enhance our understanding of the
mechanisms and processes that lead to IS-based rents. If so, we can continue to advance our understanding
of the relation between information, systems and technology, and organizational performance in the new
era of IS capability.
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